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#### Obama is using PC to hold the line on Iran sanctions now

**Haaretz 1/22**

Will AIPAC-Obama sanctions clash dent pro-Israel lobby’s clout?, 1/22/14, http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/1.569900

In previous AIPAC vs. White House dustups, the pro-Israel lobbying group’s strategy was to speak softly and let Congress carry the big stick.¶ But in the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s face-off with the Obama administration over new Iran sanctions, congressional support may not be so readily available and keeping a low public profile is proving impossible.¶ According to congressional insiders and some of the pro-Israel lobbying group’s former senior executives, AIPAC may soon face a tough choice: Stick out the battle over sanctions and potentially face a reputation-damaging defeat, or reach out to the White House and find a way for both sides to save face.¶ “I don’t believe this is sustainable, the confrontational posture,” said Steve Rosen, a former AIPAC foreign policy chief known for his hawkishness on Iran.¶ The Obama administration has taken a firm line against the sanctions bill backed by AIPAC, warning that the legislation would harm prospects for a achieving a diplomatic solution on the Iranian nuclear issue. Meanwhile, the confrontation has landed AIPAC squarely in the media spotlight and drawn pointed criticism from leading liberal commentators.¶ AIPAC has been stymied by a critical core of Senate Democrats who have sided with the Obama administration in the fight. While AIPAC’s bid to build a veto-busting majority has reached 59 -- eight short of the needed 67 -- it has stalled there in part because Democrats have more or less stopped signing on.¶ Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), the bill’s sponsors, rounded up 15 Democrats when the bill was introduced on December 19, just before Congress went on its Christmas recess. Since Congress returned this month, however, they have added just one Democrat, Michael Bennet of Colorado.¶ AIPAC, however, says its bid to pass sanctions is on track.¶ “Our top priority is stopping Iran's nuclear program, and consequently we are very engaged in building support for the Menendez-Kirk bill which now has the bi-partisan co-sponsorship of 59 senators,” AIPAC’s spokesman, Marshall Wittman, wrote in an email to JTA. “This measure would provide our negotiators with critical leverage in their efforts to achieve a peaceful end to Iran's nuclear weapons program.”¶ But in a recent interview with The New Yorker, President Obama appeared confident that backers of the bill would not reach a veto-proof majority.¶ “I don’t think a new sanctions bill will reach my desk during this period, but if it did, I would veto it and expect it to be sustained,” Obama said.¶ A source close to AIPAC said the stall in support for the legislation is due in part to the fact that of 10 committee chairmen opposed to the bill, four are Jewish and have histories of closeness to the pro-Israel community.¶ Non-Jewish lawmakers tend to take their cues on Israel-related issues from their Jewish colleagues -- a common template with lawmakers from other communities -- and this is no different, the source said.¶ AIPAC’s determined push on sanctions is drawing some anger from Democrats. A number of party insiders say that staffers on Capitol Hill are referring openly to AIPAC as an antagonist on the Iran issue in private conversations.¶ “Now it just looks like AIPAC is backing a partisan bill rather than pushing a bipartisan policy to stop Iran," said a former Democratic Hill staffer who deals in Middle Eastern issues and, like many others, asked not to be identified because of the issue’s sensitivity.¶ AIPAC’s efforts have spurred surprisingly blunt criticism from sources that are more known for caution on such matters. The new director of the National Jewish Democratic Council, Rabbi Jack Moline, earlier this month in an interview with JTA accused AIPAC activists of using “strong-arm” tactics on uncommitted senators.¶ Douglas Bloomfield, who served as AIPAC’s legislative director in the 1980s and is now frequently critical of the group, warned that with most Democrats inclined to back Obama on this issue, the confrontational posture taken by AIPAC could wound its reputation down the road.¶ “There could be repercussions across the board with a lot of members of Congress the next time they say they want them to go to the barricades,” he said.¶ AIPAC already is taking some high-profile hits on TV, with liberal commentators accusing the lobby of trying to scuttle a diplomatic settlement with Iran.¶ “The senators from the great state of Israel are against it,” comedian Jon Stewart said last week on “The Daily Show,” accompanied by a graphic of a map of Israel emblazoned with the AIPAC logo. MSNBC host Chris Hayes said the 16 Democratic senators backing the sanctions bill are “afraid” of AIPAC.¶ Rosen said that such exposure, while irritating to AIPAC, would not be a factor in getting the lobby to shift course. More serious would be calls from donors to the group who have ties to Democrats. AIPAC’s reputation as having bipartisan support -- a critical element of its influence -- could be put at risk.¶ “AIPAC puts a premium on bipartisan consensus and maintaining communication with the White House,” said Rosen, who was fired by AIPAC in 2005 after being investigated in a government leak probe, though the resulting charges were dismissed and he later sued AIPAC unsuccessfully for damages.¶ Rosen noted AIPAC’s forthcoming policy conference in March; such conferences routinely feature a top administration official -- the president or vice president, the secretary of state or defense. At least one of these failing to appear “would be devastating to AIPAC’s image of bipartisanship,” he said.¶ A way out for the group would be to quietly negotiate a compromise behind the scenes with the White House, Rosen said.¶ “They don’t want to be seen as backing down,” he said of his former employer, “but the White House is good at helping people backing down without seeming to back down.”¶ AIPAC hardly stands alone in advocating the sanctions, said an official from another Jewish group, noting that support for the bill spanned the breadth of the community from the right-wing Zionist Organization of America to the consensus-oriented Jewish Council for Public Affairs. None of these groups, including AIPAC, wanted a confrontation, the official said.¶ "It's awkward, and the pro-Israel organizations have been looking for a way to climb down from this question,” said the official, who asked not to be identified.¶ However, the official said, the Obama administration has taken a confrontational approach. The official cited a pointed remark by National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan who suggested earlier this month that congressional backers of the sanctions legislation actually favor war with Iran and “should be up front with the American public and say so.”¶ “There seems to be a concerted effort by the White House to say we’re not going to blink," said the Jewish organizational official.

#### Liberalizing policy towards Cuba costs capital – Congress will upset other items on the agenda

**LeoGrande 12**

William, School of Public Affairs @ American University, Fresh Start for a Stale Policy: Can Obama Break the Stalemate in U.S.-Cuban Relations?, 2012, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations¶ played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a¶ consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team¶ got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before¶ changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the¶ 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to¶ keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more¶ closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had¶ promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations¶ Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals.¶ At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to¶ improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the¶ bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the¶ Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC,¶ Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin¶ America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so¶ fraught with political danger. ¶ When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba,¶ which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement¶ for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel¶ regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43¶ The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late¶ Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to¶ Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him¶ dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44¶ With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the¶ Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second¶ term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four¶ years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify¶ congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other¶ Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such¶ hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again.¶ The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give¶ in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances.¶ Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the¶ Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba,¶ and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy¶ promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary¶ is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of¶ Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But¶ even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a¶ major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes¶ that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the¶ problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Successful deal key to prevent war with Iran

**Shank and Gould 9/12**

Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

**Avery 11/6**

John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

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#### Engagement requires sustained government-to-government interaction

**Sheen, 2** – associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University (Seongho, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, “US Strategy of Engagement During the Cold War and Its Implication for Sunshine Policy” <http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/14/seongho_sheen.pdf>)

Can the sunshine policy really bring positive changes within the North Korean regime and peace to the Korean peninsula? The logic behind Kim Dae-jung’s policy is a refinement of one of the major strategies of economic statecraft and military competition. In his discussion of US economic statecraft towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Michael Mastanduno provides a useful framework for understanding President Kim’s engagement policy towards the North. In general, engagement promotes positive relations with an enemy as a means of changing the behavior or policies of a target government. It accepts the legitimacy of that government and tries to shape its conduct. Engagement also requires the establishment and continuance of political communication with the target. In engaging the enemy, the state sees political polarization with target or isolation of the target country as undesirable.

#### This means they can be government contacts like trade agreements, aid, loans, or grants

**Resnik, 1** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement” v54, n2, political science complete)

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28)¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.¶

#### ‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership

**Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005** – (“Term: Possessive Pronoun,”

http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership.

EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

#### Violation – the plan does not increase government contacts but rather decreases sanctions which may result in engagement

#### **Vote neg**

#### **1. Ground – positive engagement with the state is what all links are based off of – lifting sanctions doesn’t guarantee and interaction which kills all disads**

#### **2. Predictable limits – they allow infinite tiny sanctions affs that could interact with the private sector – this makes topic prep impossible**

#### **3. Effects t is a voter – we can’t predict the internal link chain that makes them topical**

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#### The United States federal government should amend Title 22 of US Code (22 U.S.C. 6065) so that a transition government in Cuba is defined as a government that is taking appropriate steps to restitute and/or compensate United States citizens for property taken by the Cuban government, as outlined in the following addendum. The United States federal government should offer to negotiate a Bilateral Investment Treaty with Cuba that includes a Step-Down Restitution Policy.

#### We’ll insert this description of the counterplan.

#### Current language

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

§6065. Requirements and factors for determining transition government

(a) Requirements

For the purposes of this chapter, a transition government in Cuba is a government that-

(1) has legalized all political activity;

(2) has released all political prisoners and allowed for investigations of Cuban prisons by appropriate international human rights organizations;

(3) has dissolved the present Department of State Security in the Cuban Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades; and

(4) has made public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government-

(A) to be held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months after the transition government assumes power;

(B) with the participation of multiple independent political parties that have full access to the media on an equal basis, including (in the case of radio, television, or other telecommunications media) in terms of allotments of time for such access and the times of day such allotments are given; and

(C) to be conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized observers, such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other election monitors;

(5) has ceased any interference with Radio Marti or Television Marti broadcasts;

(6) makes public commitments to and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) establishing an independent judiciary;

(B) respecting internationally recognized human rights and basic freedoms as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which Cuba is a signatory nation;

(C) allowing the establishment of independent trade unions as set forth in conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, and allowing the establishment of independent social, economic, and political associations;

(7) does not include Fidel Castro or Raul Castro; and

(8) has given adequate assurances that it will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people.

(b) Additional factors

In addition to the requirements in subsection (a) of this section, in determining whether a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President shall take into account the extent to which that government-

(1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist totalitarian dictatorship to representative democracy;

(2) has made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable progress in-

(A) effectively guaranteeing the rights of free speech and freedom of the press, including granting permits to privately owned media and telecommunications companies to operate in Cuba;

(B) permitting the reinstatement of citizenship to Cuban-born persons returning to Cuba;

(C) assuring the right to private property; and

(D) taking appropriate steps to return to United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban Government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or to provide equitable compensation to such citizens and entities for such property;

(3) has extradited or otherwise rendered to the United States all persons sought by the United States Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States; and

(4) has permitted the deployment throughout Cuba of independent and unfettered international human rights monitors.

(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)

#### Language post-counterplan

Title 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE CHAPTER 69A-CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) SUBCHAPTER II-ASSISTANCE TO FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA

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~~(Pub. L. 104–114, title II, §205, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 811.)~~

#### Setting up a Bilateral Investment Treaty as a mechanism for compensation helps Cuba meet the only condition that is keeping the embargo in place

**Mowry, ’99** (David, Senior Counsel Xerox Corporation “Lifting the Embargo against Cuba Using Vietnam as a Model: A Policy Paper for Modernity” Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 25 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 229, lexis)

The obstacles that prevent a President from lifting the embargo against Cuba arbitrarily would appear to be no more than a facade of legislation. n210 If the President determines that it is prudent for the United States to once again open trade relations with Cuba, then the President may, after the appropriate reports to Congress, lift the embargo. n211 Of course the American Congress has the power to override a Presidential decree by a two-thirds majority, and it seems that no President would take such a politically volatile step without extensive consultation with, and acquiescence of, Congressional leadership. n212 Given the normalization of relations with the Communist leadership of Vietnam, America's reasons for imposing the embargo against Cuba can no longer be said to hinge on the Communist ideology of Cuba's leadership. Rather, [\*259] the final issue yet to be resolved, or discussed by the United States and Cuba, surrounds the property claims resulting from the expropriation of property during the Castro revolution. As the statutory authority, specifically LIBERTAD, suggests, the settlement of claims for property seized during the beginning of Castro's rise to power are as yet unsettled. n213 International law is made up of international custom and international agreement. n214 Only states consenting to such agreements are bound by the agreements. n215 Accepted practices among states, as well as international tribunal decisions, can give rise to international custom. n216 International law requires a state to pay full compensation for "takings" of foreign owned property. n217 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a taking that is discriminatory, not for a public purpose, and not accompanied by "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation is unlawful. n218 The United States maintains that the property seized by Cuba was part of an expropriation program that discriminated against U.S. nationals, was not for a public purpose, and compensation that was to have been prompt, adequate, and effective, has never been paid. n219 Though there are arguments from developing nations that "full" compensation should be a relative term so as not to upset a developing economy, [\*260] international tribunals have held that full compensation is the standard under international law. n220 The issue of settling the property claims against Cuba would seem to be as simple as Cuba signing an agreement with the United States, much as Vietnam did, promising to compensate the U.S. Government and its national claimants what it owes them. n221 For Vietnam, the amount was U.S. $ 208 million, in Cuba's case the amount is approximately U.S. $ 13 billion. n222 The amount of money owed by Cuba for the takings brings about a dilemma for the United States. Cuba, in its current economic state, would not be able to pay U.S. $ 13 billion; conversely, if the U.S. Government were to settle with Cuba for an amount less than that owed, the U.S. Government could be held liable to any of the over 5000 claimants to the taken property for the difference. n223 The potential liability of the U.S. Government may be the motivation that has kept the United States from negotiating a settlement with Cuba. As Cuba's economy has continued to grow, albeit at a slow pace, there appears to be little chance that the United States could negotiate a one-time payment from Cuba for what has continued to grow to well over U.S. $ 13 billion. However, utilizing a carefully planned business investment treaty, as well as a "road map" modeled on the tactics used with Vietnam, the United States could approach Cuba with a plan that would not only satisfy the claims for taken property and avoid American liability and litigation with the former property owners, but would sufficiently bolster the Cuban economy so that full compensation could be paid over time. The U.S. statutes currently in place do not require full [\*261] compensation for taken property before the embargo against Cuba may be lifted. n224 Phase one of the "road map" with Cuba, therefore, would consist of the United States approaching Cuba with a draft BIT, n225 as well as indications that the embargo will be lifted if certain steps are followed: Cuba will have to facilitate a change in policy towards the United States and indicate a willingness, by signing the BIT, to begin compensation for the taken property, as well as a willingness to consider multiparty elections. Phase two of the "road map" would consist of the partial lifting of the embargo against Cuba by having the United States alleviate travel restrictions, and open telecommunications lines and services with Cuba. This would begin to fuel the Cuban tourism economy, and would allow Cuba to begin updating its obsolete communications technology systems. n226 Conversely, Cuba would begin payments into a central compensation fund of a set amount per year, to be determined by the two governments. These payments would be compensation for any properties that Cuba is unwilling, or unable to restore, to the former owners. Cuba would also have to hold free elections with at least one other viable political party other than the Communist party. Phase three, the final phase, would consist of the transition of Cuba's Government from a one party oligarchy to a freely elected ruling body. The United States would then lift all trade restrictions against Cuba, as per the BIT. The influx of trade from the United States would strengthen Cuba's economy sufficiently so that the graduated repayments to former owners of property in Cuba would compensate them for their losses, and the U.S. Government would not be liable for any losses. [\*262]

#### Step-Down Restitution Policy is the best mechanism --- flexibility in payment ensures appropriate and quick redress and means Cuba says yes

**Espino, ‘8** (Daniel- JD Candidate Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, President and Chairman of the Board of Puente de Jovenes Profesionales Cubanos and President of the Hispanic Law Students Association, Spring, “Step-Down Restitution: A Proposal For An Equitable Resolution To Confiscated Cuban Property” Nova Law Review, 32 Nova L. Rev. 423, lexis)

[\*451] V. IMPLEMENTATION The Step-Down Restitution Policy should be implemented by way of a special tribunal or court established by agreement between the United States and Cuba. Such an agreement must include a provision in which both countries commit "to act in good faith so as to promote the mutual prosperity of their nations and citizens." n188 A post-Castro Cuban government must pledge to create a special court to resolve all confiscated property claims "by Cuban nationals who became nationals of the United States after the date of accrual of such claims." n189 This court will have independent and limited jurisdiction within the Cuban judicial system. n190 In implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy, a future Cuban property claims court can turn to the lessons learned in Iran and Ethiopia, where similar courts were introduced to handle confiscated property claims. n191 A. Lessons from Iran In 1982, Iran and the United States established a dedicated tribunal for the redress of property claims akin to the one needed in Cuba to implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy. n192 The need for a claims tribunal in the case of Iran was prompted by the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Forces acting in support of the Ayatollah seized not only the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, but also many privately held American assets. Correspondingly, the necessity of claims tribunals in the case of Cuba was prompted by Castro's revolution in 1959, and the still-uncompensated property seizures that went along with it. The two situations thus present similarities in terms of the emotional and political aspects of the breakdown in relations. n193 Like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy will have to apply law and policy in a flexible manner, granting jurisdiction over a series of claims that arise in differing circumstances, taking law and policy from various sources including Cuban and international law, and granting different redress [\*452] depending on the circumstances. n194 However, in issuing remedies, a future Cuban property claims court should do well to consider that Cuba, unlike Iran, has low-valued currency and limited or no funds with which to pay compensation claims--claims that may include payment of the value of property, interest, lost profits, and/or past unpaid rent. n195 As such, the preferred remedy of direct restitution should be granted where possible. An important lesson Cuba can learn from Iran is that "much can be done with informal structures and the good will of [the] participants." n196 Because the Step-Down Restitution Policy does not provide for the expulsion of tenants and businesses on confiscated properties, informal mediations could facilitate the settlement of property claims where the true owner simply seeks reinstitution of title and would be content with collecting rent from tenants on the property. Given the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the sizeable Cuban/Cuban American population residing in the United States, relations with Cuba and the establishment of a Cuban property claims court will not likely suffer the delays and set-backs faced in Iran given the limited cultural boundaries and understood motivations amongst the groups with interests in Cuba. n197 B. Lessons from Ethiopia The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission is another example of a property claims tribunal created by bilateral treaty. n198 While the Ethiopian Commission was given broad jurisdiction--even so far as to include tort claims--in a post war scenario, a future Cuban property claims court implementing the Step-Down Restitution Policy may nevertheless find applicable case law stemming from the Ethiopian court because of their stance on confiscated property. n199 The Ethiopian Commission stated: A belligerent is bound to ensure insofar as possible that the property of protected persons is not despoiled or wasted. If private property of enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired in wartime, it must be done by the State, and under conditions [\*453] providing for the property's protection and its eventual disposition by return to the owners or through post-war agreement. n200 Such a proclamation is at the heart of the Step-Down Restitution Policy and should be at the heart of any remediation treaty, program, or policy implemented by Cuba. VI. CONCLUSION Cuba will eventually take its first step towards the long road to a free market society. In this endeavor, Cuba should implement the Step-Down Restitution Policy as a means of achieving a prompt and efficient resolution to hundreds of thousands of property claims. The presumptive remedy of restitution will allow many Cuban exiles to take up their property and begin to make improvements to it immediately with the resources they have amassed while living elsewhere, mainly the United States. While situations may arise where former property owners find occupants currently living on the expropriated property, the Cuban government should take measures to prevent conflict between the parties and the eviction of these individuals. Given the poor housing sector, Cuba will likely have to implement legislation calling for the construction of affordable housing for Cuban Nationals living on the island currently oc-cupying confiscated property, who do not have their own confiscated property to which to return. Restitution is most appropriate for commercial properties which have undergone little or no change during the Castro regime. Given its proximity to the United States, Cuba will surely attract an enormous number of tourists from the United States and will most likely become a "stop" on the itineraries of many vacation cruise lines, like Puerto Rico and the Bahamas. With the potential for sudden interest in the country, Cuba will need to provide fast and efficient remedies to corporate claimants. With the award of direct restitution, corporate claimants may immediately use their property or alienate their property to corporations who have the resources and are ready to invest in industries such as tourism and mining. The greatest strength of restitution is the symbolism of the act. Restitution represents returning Cuba to its pre-Communist days of individual success and economic prosperity. The greatest strength of the Step-Down Restitution Policy, however, is the flexibility afforded to the fledgling democratic Cuban Government in its ability to award appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis. With the adoption of such a policy, a healthy body of case law will quickly be established and allow for the dispensation of property claims based on differing scenarios. Although Cuba has limited land resources to offer in the form of substituted restitution, varying forms of compensation coupled with restitution or alternative remedies will allow Cuba to adequately, efficiently, and equitably handle confiscated property claims. The different types of claimants which will approach Cuba seeking restitution and the various forms of property expropriated during the Castro regime should force Cuba to avoid applying a one-size-fits-all resolution to confiscated property claims. Such a sweeping method aimed to settle all claims quickly will infuriate those on the short end of the remediation arrangement. The Step-Down Restitution Policy, with its varying remedies, allows for former owners to seek justice for Cuba's transgressions by allowing them to receive individualistic and equitable remediation.

#### Failure to resolve the property issue chills foreign investment

**Smagula**, Associate with Totti, Rodriguez Diaz & Fuentes, **’95** (John, Fall, “Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 21 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 66, lexis)

There is an increasing chorus of advocates for the "liberal" view. Former President Jimmy Carter stated that "it's time for us [the United States] to begin discussions on how we can alleviate this crisis which has caused tremendous suffering among the people of Cuba and has distorted this hemisphere's concept of freedom and democ- [\*103] racy." n314 Professor Andrew Zimbalist suggests the United States lift the embargo all at once, stating that the United States may retain leverage over Cuba by, inter alia, waiving compensation for confiscated property. n315 Professor Rudi Dornbusch suggests that in a post-Castro Cuba, "whether and when financial compensation should be offered can be discussed in time," since Cuba's resources should be kept free for reconstruction. n316 U.S. Representative Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) has proposed that the United States unilaterally lift the embargo against Cuba, urging the President to take steps to settle the property claims of U.S. citizens after lifting the embargo. n317 Several other commentators have similarly condemned the embargo. n318 These arguments confuse the true rationale of the embargo and advocate a course of action that is detrimental to Cuba. The property dimension of the embargo has been fully established, n319 and successful resolution of the property issue is necessary to for a climate of investor confidence in the Cuban economy. n320 Former President Richard Nixon n321 and the Wall Street Journal have advocated the "free trade" view. The Wall Street Journal, comparing the situation in Cuba to China's recent pattern of development, argues that lifting the embargo would benefit "precisely those forces that are most likely to liberalize Cuba's economic and political power structure." n322 Lifting the embargo, without resolving the property issue, will not bring about the desired change. It is clear that foreign direct investment is widely accepted as essential to developing economies. Without respect for property rights, the flow of foreign investment is likely to be insignificant and limited to short-term get-rich-quick schemes. Furthermore, if Cuba is to develop like China, Cuba must do precisely what China did: resolve the property issue. n323 [\*104]

#### Adequate investment is the lynchpin to Cuba’s economy – other internal links insufficient

**Smagula**, Associate with Totti, Rodriguez Diaz & Fuentes, **’95** (John, Fall, “Redirecting Focus: Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation, 21 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 66, lexis)

D. Investor Confidence Considerations Foreign investors are essential to the economic growth of developing states. n260 Investors are more likely to invest in a country when they are confident that they will capture the expected future returns from their investment. n261 Consistent with this theme of investor confidence [\*95] is the protection of property rights. n262 The protection of property rights entails both a guarantee to pay full compensation for any property that may be expropriated in the future and the guarantee of rights to compensation for previously expropriated property. The developing countries' need for foreign investment seriously impairs the validity of any partial compensation standard for potentially expropriated property. n263 A partial compensation standard would only deter the necessary foreign investment n264 because investors are more likely to invest in a state if the state can take the investors' assets only with the payment of compensation. n265 The denial of rights to compensation for previously expropriated property also weakens a state's ability to attract foreign investment. n266 Denial of compensation would expose investors to additional uncertainty by providing a dangerous precedent that their property rights may not be respected.

#### Cuban instability collapse causes Latin American instability and terror attacks

**Gorrell ‘5** (Tim, Lieutenant Colonel, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” 3/18/5, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

### cred

#### No impact to heg.

**Fettweis 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Cred is irrelevant

**Kagan, 06** ([Robert](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=16&prog=zgp&proj=zusr), senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Washington Post, 1/15, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr)

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

#### Hegemony inevitable- power is relative

**Bremmer and Gordon 12/27** (Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?” David F. Gordon, former director of policy planning at the State Department, is head of research at Eurasia Group, “An Upbeat View of America's 'Bad' Year”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/opinion/an-upbeat-view-of-americas-bad-year.html?pagewanted=all>, December 27, 2011,

Among global big thinkers, never a bashful crowd, the notion of a United States in decline has become conventional wisdom. In late 2011, this narrative has crescendoed, with experts arguing that China has surpassed the United States economically, Niall Ferguson declaring that we are at “the end of 500 years of Western predominance” and The National Interest proclaiming “the end of the American era.” Even the National Intelligence Council’s coming Global Trends 2030 study reportedly assumes an America in decline. As 2011 draws to a close, the U.S. military’s exit from Iraq and challenges in Afghanistan along with American vulnerability to the European crisis provide further confirmation of the decline narrative. We agree with some of these views. The United States has neither the willingness nor the capability to provide the kind of global leadership that it has provided in the past several decades, and other countries are increasingly less willing to follow America’s lead. But the conventional wisdom obscures as much as it reveals. Specifically, the declinists overlook the inconvenient truth that global power is relative. And comparing America’s year to that of our present and potential adversaries paints an interesting picture: 2011 was not the year when the United States fell off the wagon. Instead, a look back at the past 12 months suggests that U.S. power is more resilient than the narrative of inevitable decline portrays. Take Al Qaeda, our most consistent adversary (by their definition and ours) since the 9/11 attacks. Despite some severe missteps, we have in 10 years degraded Al Qaeda’s capabilities to the point that they are having difficulty mounting attacks against significant targets. In 2011, the United States killed Al Qaeda’s most effective propagandist, Anwar al-Awlaki; its operating chief, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman; and of course its founder, chief executive and spiritual leader, Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the Arab Spring undercut the notion that political change in the Middle East requires the violent jihad that Bin Laden spent his career espousing. The fight against extremist Islam is an impossible one in which to declare success. Yet the fact remains that while Al Qaeda began the War on Terror with a horrific assault on the foremost symbols of U.S. economic and military power, it leaves 2011 effectively leaderless, rudderless and reduced to boasting about kidnapping defenseless U.S. aid workers. Iran’s leaders also exit 2011 in worse shape than they entered it. Early in the year, they viewed the demise of Middle Eastern potentates as accelerating their rise to regional dominance. Turkish anger over the Mavi Marmara incident continued to draw Ankara closer to Tehran. Saudi anger at the perceived lack of U.S. support for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak seemed to threaten a permanent rupture in the U.S. relationship with a key ally, and Iran assumed that it would be the beneficiary of declining American influence in the Arab World. But the Arab Spring has unfolded very differently. Iran’s closest, most vital, and in some ways only Arab ally, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, ends the year leading an embattled, isolated regime facing a combination of civil war and economic sanctions that his government is unlikely to survive. Iran’s relationship with Turkey has deteriorated sharply, and, along with Saudi Arabia, Ankara has in fact drawn closer to the United States. Indeed, the nascent U.S.-Turkey-Saudi troika is one of the most important but least noticed trends of the past few months. Combined with another year without nuclear weapons — the program apparently thwarted significantly by covert operations — and a tightening vise of economic sanctions, these events have left Iran’s leaders disoriented. After years of growing consensus, Iran’s elites are now increasingly fragmented and at one another’s throats. Moreover, Tehran spent the past few months engaged in a stunning series of blunders: plotting with Mexican drug dealers to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and allowing regime supporters to storm the British Embassy in Tehran, the combination of which has re-energized global efforts to squeeze Iran financially. The assumption that Iran is the emerging regional power has shattered. China, which most of the declinists identify as America’s greatest future rival, has likewise had a difficult 2011. With U.S. willingness to lead receding, the international spotlight has fallen on Beijing. And on every issue — the euro zone crisis, climate change and rebalancing the global economy — China has declined to take the lead, to criticism and dismay at home and abroad. Beijing has failed to reconcile rising domestic nationalism with assuaging its neighbors’ increasing alarm over Chinese economic sustainability and strategic hegemony. China’s miscalculations in Northeast and Southeast Asia have allowed the United States to reassert traditional alliances in the region (with Japan and South Korea), establish new beachheads (placing a permanent U.S. Marine Corps presence in Australia), and create a process and institutions (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) for a balanced Asia–Pacific regional architecture, rather than one dominated by the Middle Kingdom. Compared to this, 2011 has not been a bad year for America. It is a stretch to call the Iraq war a victory, but the endgame in the Afghan quagmire is slowly coming into focus. And for all our fiscal problems, global funding has to flow somewhere, and our capital markets are still unparalleled. China won’t internationalize the renminbi, the euro is fragile and gold is not a country. As a result, the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and U.S. Treasury bills the global financial safe haven. This will inevitably change in the long term, but not for quite some time. The unipolar moment is over. But for 2011 at least, the world order has remained the United States and the rest.

#### Lifting the embargo is appeasement – it’s a concession to leftist regimes which spurs global anti-Americanism

**Brooks 9** - Sterling Professor Emeritus of Comparative Literature at Yale University and Andrew W. Mellon Scholar in the department of Comparative Literature and the Center for Human Values at Princeton University (Peter, The Heritage Foundation, “Keep the Embargo, O,” 4/16/2009, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o>) //RGP

In another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.¶ Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.¶ Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America.¶ And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.¶ In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not.¶ And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.¶ Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies.¶ So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us.¶ Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.¶ Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

### ag

#### Scarcity doesn’t cause war – 5 reasons

**Deudney 99** (Daniel, Asst Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics )

Another major limitation of most studies on environmental conflict is that they rarely consider the character of the overall international system in assessing the prospects for conflict and violence. Of course, it is impossible to analyze everything at once, but conclusions about conflictual outcomes are premature until the main features of the world political system are factored in. The frequency with which environmental scarcity and conflict will produce violent conflict, particularly interstate wars, is profoundly shaped by six features of contemporary world politics: (1) the prevalance of capitalism and the extent of international trade; (2) the existence of numerous functional international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and epistemic communities; (3) highly developed state-system institutions; and (4) the existence of nuclear weapons; (5) the widespread diffusion of conventional weaponry; and (6) the influence of a hegemonic coalition of liberal constitutional democracies. These deeply rooted material and institutional features of the contemporary world order greatly reduce the likelihood that environmental scarcities and change will lead to interstate violence (see figure 8.1).

#### Adaptation solves

**Doremus, 2k** (Holly, Professor of Law at UC Davis Washington & Lee Law Review, Winter 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, lexis)

In recent years, this discourse frequently has taken the form of the ecological horror story . That too is no mystery. The ecological horror story is unquestionably an attention-getter, especially in the hands of skilled writers [\*46] like Carson and the Ehrlichs. The image of the airplane earth, its wings wobbling as rivet after rivet is carelessly popped out, is difficult to ignore. The apocalyptic depiction of an impending crisis of potentially dire proportions is designed to spur the political community to quick action . Furthermore, this story suggests a goal that appeals to many nature lovers: that virtually everything must be protected. To reinforce this suggestion, tellers of the ecological horror story often imply that the relative importance of various rivets to the ecological plane cannot be determined. They offer reams of data and dozens of anecdotes demonstrating the unexpected value of apparently useless parts of nature. The moth that saved Australia from prickly pear invasion, the scrubby Pacific yew, and the downright unattractive leech are among the uncharismatic flora and fauna who star in these anecdotes. n211 The moral is obvious: because we cannot be sure which rivets are holding the plane together, saving them all is the only sensible course. Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, the complete elimination of life on earth seems unlikely. Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse.

#### Cuban agriculture already spurring worldwide adoption

**Ergas, 13** – graduate student in sociology at the University of Oregon (Christina, Monthly Review, March, “Cuban Urban Agriculture as a Strategy for Food Sovereignty” http://monthlyreview.org/2013/03/01/cuban-urban-agriculture-as-a-strategy-for-food-sovereignty)//VP

¶ The agricultural revolution in Cuba has ignited the imaginations of people all over the world. Cuba’s model serves as a foundation for self-sufficiency, resistance to neocolonialist development projects, innovations in agroecology, alternatives to monoculture, and a more environmentally sustainable society. Instead of turning towards austerity measures and making concessions to large international powers during a severe economic downturn, Cubans reorganized food production and worked to gain food sovereignty as a means of subsistence, environmental protection, and national security.1 While these efforts may have been born of economic necessity, they are impressive as they have been developed in opposition to a corporate global food regime.¶ In Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba, Sinan Koont indicates that most of the global South has lost any semblance of food sovereignty—the ability to be self-sufficient, to practice a more sustainable form of agriculture, and to direct farming toward meeting the needs of people within a country, rather than producing cash crops for export (187). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programs and free trade agreements on the so-called third world. These policies increased the influence of multinational corporations, such as Monsanto and Cargill, in global food production. They also encouraged large-scale monocultures, whereby food production is specialized by region for international trade. These policies threatened the national food security of countries in several interrelated ways.2¶ First, economically vulnerable countries are subject to the vagaries of the international marketplace, fluctuating food prices, and heavily subsidized produce from the global North that undermine the ability of the former to compete. Second, in a for-profit economic system, certain crops, like sugarcane, potato, and corn, are planted to produce biofuels, primarily ethanol, instead of food for poor populations. Rich nations that can afford to buy crops for biofuels inflate market prices for food, and when droughts or floods destroy whole harvests, then scarce food still goes to the highest bidder. Third, nations that specialize in cash crops for export must import food, increasing overall insecurity and dependency on trade networks. These nations are more vulnerable to changes in the costs of petroleum, as it influences expenses associated with transportation, fertilizers, pesticides, and the overall price of food. In countries with higher per capita incomes, increasing food costs are an annoyance for many people but not necessarily life threatening. In countries with high rates of poverty, price increases can be devastating. All of the above problems converged during the 2007–2008 food crisis that resulted in riots in Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Mexico, and Bangladesh, just to name a few.¶ People worldwide have been affected by these policies and have fought back. Some nations have taken to task corporations like Monsanto, as in the case of India’s response to genetically modified eggplant, which involved a boycott of Monsanto’s products and demands for the eradication of genetically modified foods.3 There are burgeoning local food movements, even in the United States, that despite numerous challenges attempt to produce food outside the current large-scale agricultural paradigm.4 There are also international movements that are working to change agricultural policies and practices. For example, La Vía Campesina is an international movement comprised of peasants, small-scale farmers, and their allies. Their primary goals are to stop neoliberal policies that promote oligopolistic corporate control over agriculture and to promote food sovereignty.¶ In conjunction with these movements, Cuba has made remarkable strides toward establishing a system of food sovereignty. One of their most notable projects in this regard is their institutionalized and organized effort to expand agroecological practices, or a system of agriculture that is based on ecological principles and environmental concerns. Cuba has largely transformed food production in order to pursue a more sustainable path. These practices are not limited to the countryside.¶ Cuba is the recognized leader of urban agriculture.5 As Koont highlights, the Cuban National Group for Urban Agriculture defines urban agriculture as the production of food within the urban and peri-urban perimeter, using intensive methods, paying attention to the human-crop-animal-environment interrelationships, and taking advantage of the urban infrastructure with its stable labor force. This results in diversified production of crops and animals throughout the year, based on sustainable practices which allow the recycling of waste materials (29). In 2007, urban agriculture comprised approximately 14.6 percent of agriculture in Cuba. Almost all of urban agriculture is organic.¶ Cuba’s environmental protections and agricultural innovations have gained considerable recognition. The 2006 Sustainability Index Report, put together by the World Wildlife Fund by combining the United Nations Human Development Index and Ecological Footprint measures (or natural resource use per capita), contends that the only nation in the world that is living sustainably is Cuba.6 The island nation is particularly lauded for its strides in urban food production.7 Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is the first book to take a comprehensive look at this practice around the entire island.¶ Koont indicates that the significance of urban agriculture in Cuba is that although Cuba is not completely food self-sufficient, it is the only example the world has of a country that produces most of its food locally, employing agroecological techniques for production. Furthermore, most of the food produced is for local consumption. As a result, Cuba has one of the shortest producer-to-consumer chains in the world. In this book, Koont documents the impressive transformations that have taken place within this nation.¶ While Cuba imports the majority of its calories and protein, urban agriculture has increased food security and sovereignty in the area of vegetable production. In 2005, Cuba was “importing 60 percent to 70 percent of what it consumes [mostly so-called bulk foods] at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually.”8 However, urban agriculture within and around Havana accounts for 60–90 percent of the produce consumed in the city and utilizes about 87,000 acres of land.9 Cubans employ various forms of urban agriculture, including gardens, reforestation projects, and small-scale livestock operations. In 2010, 75 percent of the Cuban population lived in cities—a city is defined as such if the population is in excess of 1,000 persons.10 Thus, urban food production is the most practical and efficient means to supply the population with food.¶ These transformations did not suddenly materialize. Koont provides a useful overview of the historical circumstances that contributed to changes in food production in Cuba. After the 1959 revolution and the subsequent imposition of the U.S. embargo, Cuba became reliant on the Soviet Union. Cubans used large-scale, industrial, monoculture to produce sugar, which was exchanged for Soviet petroleum and currency. The economy was largely tied to high-yield sugar production. In a vicious cycle, this type of agriculture required importing agrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and oil to run heavy machinery. In 1989, three times more arable land in Cuba was utilized to produce sugar for export than food for national consumption. Most of the Cuban diet came from imported food.11¶ When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Cubans and their economy suffered greatly. Cubans no longer had access to the inputs required to maintain large-scale agriculture, given how dependent such agriculture is on oil. To make matters worse, the end of trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba resulted in a loss of access to food, which reduced Cubans’ protein intake by 30 percent.12 The system of agriculture that was in place was not sustainable or organized for self-sufficiency. Cubans refer to the ensuing period of resource scarcity as the Special Period in Peace Time. This period included shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. Faced with food scarcity and malnutrition, Cubans had to revamp their food production systems, which included collectively producing a variety of crops in the most efficient manner possible. Additionally, the necessary mission of Cuban politicians, ecologists, farmers, scientists, biologists, and farm workers was to mend the ecological cycles of interdependence that large-scale, exploitative agriculture destroyed.13¶ In spite of these hardships, Cuban society was equipped to contend with the ensuing crisis, given the country’s specific commitments and agroecological projects that were already in operation. The Cuban government and leadership worked to provide institutional support to re-direct food production and to enable the development of an extensive urban agricultural project. Governmental policies, following the 1959 revolution, that prioritized extending education, science, and technology served as a springboard for these new agricultural projects. First, the revolutionary government established organizations to address social problems and concerns. These organizations served as supply and distribution networks for food and centers for research that examined farmers’ traditional knowledge, continuing education programs that taught agroecological practices, distribution of technological innovations, and evaluation of existing programs and operations. Second, the government prioritized human resources and capabilities. Thus, the Cuban government invested in human capital by making education more widely available and accessible at all levels. Making use of the organizational infrastructure and investing in the Cuban people made the agroecological transition possible during the economic crisis in the early 1990s.¶ Koont examines how the early agroecological projects, prior to the Special Period, served as a basis for future development and expansion of the revolutionary transformation of agriculture in Cuba. Science is publicly owned and directed toward furthering human development, rather than capital accumulation. Cuba had the human resources to address food scarcity, given that they had 11 percent of the scientists in Latin America. Scientists were already experimenting with agroecology, in order to take advantage of ecological synergisms, utilizing biodiversity and biological pest control. These efforts were focused on diminishing the need for inputs such as artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Other projects included integrating animals into rotational grazing systems with crops and diversifying with polycultures. Cubans also began recycling sugarcane waste as cattle feed; the cows, in turn, excrete waste that is applied to soil as fertilizer, thereby restoring ecological interdependence. By combining manure with worm castings, Cubans were able to fertilize most of their crops organically without having to import fertilizer from long distances. Their experimentation also included creating urban organopónicos, which were constructed four years before the Soviet collapse. Organopónicos are raised beds of organic materials confined in rectangular walls where plants are grown in areas with poor soil quality. Additionally, personal household plots had long existed within urban areas.14 Altogether these experiments and projects served as the foundation to pursue greater self-sufficiency, a system of urban agriculture, and a more sustainable form of food production.¶ The pursuit of food sovereignty has yielded many benefits. Urban agriculture has increased food production, employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building. Perhaps the most impressive strides are in the area of food security. In the early 1990s, during the Special Period, Cubans’ caloric intake decreased to approximately 1,863 calories a day. In the midst of food scarcity, Cuba ramped up food production. Between 1994 and 2006, Cubans increased urban output by a thousand fold, with an annual growth rate of 78 percent a year. In 2001, Cubans cultivated 18,591 hectares of urban land; in 2006, 52,389 hectares were cultivated. As a result of these efforts, the caloric intake for the population averaged 3,356 calories a day in 2005. During the economic crisis, unemployment sharply increased. However, the creation of extensive urban agricultural programs, which included centers of information and education, provided new jobs that subsumed 7 percent of the workforce and provided good wages.¶ Urban agriculture and reforestation projects also constituted important gains for the environment. Shifting food production away from reliance on fossil fuels and petrochemicals is better for human health and reduces the carbon dioxide emissions associated with food production. Urban reforestation projects provide sinks for air pollution and help beautify cities. Finally, local production of food decreases food miles. It also requires both local producers and consumers. Therefore, community members get to know each other and are responsible for each other throu gh the production and consumption of food.¶ Sustainable Urban Agriculture in Cuba is a detailed documentation of the agroecological transformation in Cuba. Koont delivers a significant amount of information regarding the mechanics of urban agriculture. He highlights the enabling factors of urban agriculture in Cuba, which are the government’s creation of the organizational infrastructure and their investment in human capital. He also provides an assessment of the results from urban agriculture. The results he discusses are gains made in food production, increased employment, environmental recovery and protection, and community building.¶ However, the majority of the book reads like a dry technical manual or guide to urban agriculture, something akin to official Cuban government documents. There are many bulleted lists throughout each chapter that outline types of crops grown, strategies, key features of urban agriculture in Cuba, collaborating organizations, evaluation criteria, tons of produce in each province, program objectives, and the lists go on. While the book contains a significant amount of information regarding process, extent, technology, education, and evaluation surrounding urban agriculture in Cuba, it does little in the way of setting up a theoretical framework and thoroughly exploring the significance of Cuba’s model of urban agriculture for the world. The introduction and the final chapter of the book are the two chapters that touch on Cuba’s relevance and implications. In addition, Koont offers minimal critical analysis of the challenges that Cubans still face in their quest for food sovereignty.¶ Despite these shortcomings, Koont provides a much-needed detailed account of the strides made in Cuban urban agriculture. Cuba’s example has clear implications for food sovereignty and security for the rest of the world. With the very real threat of climate change, potential energy crises, market fluctuations, worldwide droughts, or other economic and environmental problems that may force nations to relocalize food production, this example can serve as a template for future food sovereignty. We can continue to learn from Cuba as they generate new technologies and innovations in organic urban agriculture into the future. In addition, the Cuban example serves as a testament to the potential for a society’s resilience and is worth investigating not just for their innovations, but for inspiration.

#### Lifting sanctions allow the US to undercut the Cuban model-- that turns the case

**Gonzalez, 4 -** Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law

(Carmen, “WHITHER GOES CUBA? PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PART II OF II: Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development” 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 419, lexis)//HA

The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the eventual renewal of trade relations with the United States and the re-integration of Cuba into the global trading system. At the behest of the United States, Cuba was excluded from major trade and financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade organizations. n357 Paradoxically, while Cuba's economic isolation produced enormous hardship, it also gave Cuba free rein to respond to the crisis of the Special Period in ways that diverged radically from the prevailing neoliberal model.¶ One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the [\*483] IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank. n358 With an external debt of approximately $ 12 billion as well as an additional $ 15 billion to $ 20 billion debt to Russia, n359 Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans and debt restructuring assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order to normalize relations with external creditors and to obtain badly needed infusions of capital.¶ Debt relief, however, will come at a very high price. Cuba, like other developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal reforms pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF. These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues available for debt service by slashing social spending and vigorously promoting exports. In light of Cuba's "comparative advantage" in agricultural production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed emphasis on sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports (such as flowers, fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food production, to drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural subsidies and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned enterprises, and to open its markets to foreign competition. These reforms would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and reduce tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies. Cuba would also be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops unless Cuba could present strict scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty regarding the effects of genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba, like Argentina, would become a major cultivator of genetically modified crops.¶ Based on the track record of the neoliberal model in the developing world, it appears that Cuba's adoption of the standard package of neoliberal reforms would jeopardize food security at the national level. First, the neoliberal reforms would undercut domestic food production by diverting prime agricultural land to export production and by requiring Cuba to open its markets to cheap, subsidized food from the United States. This would reduce Cuba's food self-sufficiency and would reinstate Cuba's dangerous dependence on food imports to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Second, renewed emphasis on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange would make Cuba's trade-based entitlements highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world market agricultural prices and to the declining terms of [\*484] trade for agricultural products. In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba's production-based entitlements would be eroded in favor of highly precarious trade-based entitlements. n360 In addition, a significant percentage of Cuba's export earnings would be earmarked for debt service and thus unavailable for investment or for the importation of food and other vital items. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops would reinstate Cuba's trade dependence on the United States (and subordinate Cuba's food security to U.S. political and economic interests) by shutting Cuba out of lucrative EU markets.¶ The neoliberal model would also jeopardize food security at the household level by fueling rural poverty and inequality. The promotion of export production is likely to provoke a land grab by elite Cubans and transnational corporations at the expense of Cuban smallholders. Export production tends to favor wealthy farmers with ready access to capital who can benefit from economies of scale in both production and marketing and can withstand the dramatic price fluctuations that plague many export commodities. n361 Furthermore, the opening of Cuba's markets to cheap food imports from the United States, in conjunction with the slashing of agricultural subsidies and social safety nets, will threaten the livelihoods of the majority of Cuban farmers and produce economic polarization in rural areas. Finally, the cultivation of genetically modified crops is likely to accelerate the dispossession of small farmers by disrupting the traditional practice of saving, sharing, and breeding seeds. As farmers become increasingly dependent on seeds and other inputs produced by transnational corporations, they may suffer severe economic dislocation if input prices increase or if farm revenues drop. Dispossessed farmers are likely to migrate en masse to towns and cities, thereby straining limited urban amenities. In the terminology of [\*485] entitlements, Cuban smallholders are likely to be deprived of production-based entitlements (land with which to grow food), trade-based entitlements (the ability to buy food on the market with the income generated by agricultural production), labor-based entitlements (due to the loss of jobs to mechanization on the large farms), and transfer-based entitlements (state subsidies and food aid).¶ Neoliberal economic reforms may also jeopardize Cuba's experiment in sustainable agriculture. Export production tends to reinforce ecologically unsustainable monocultures that require extensive application of agrochemicals. These monocultures displace traditional food crops that contribute to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. The cultivation of genetically modified crops may exacerbate the problems associated with industrial agriculture by reinforcing monocultural production, eroding biodiversity, and increasing the use of herbicides and insecticides

#### **MARK**

(by accelerating resistance to these products). Even if Cuba is able to capture an export niche in the lucrative market for certified organic products, the introduction of genetically modified organisms may undermine Cuba's efforts by producing genetic contamination. Moreover, the cultivation of Bt crops may injure organic farmers by accelerating resistance to one of the most widely used natural pesticides. Finally, if the cultivation of genetically modified crops results in increased use of herbicides and insecticides, this may harm organic agriculture by killing non-target organisms (including the natural enemies of the target pest and other beneficial insects) and by producing ecosystem-wide disturbances.¶ In short, Cuba's adoption of neoliberal economic reforms threatens to recreate colonial and post-colonial patterns of land tenure and production, whereby the ruling elite and transnational corporations grow export crops on large industrial farms while small-scale producers are relegated to marginal subsistence plots or forced to abandon agriculture altogether. Furthermore, the cultivation of genetically modified crops may re-introduce trade dependency on the United States by foreclosing access to the lucrative European market. The prospects for food security and ecological sustainability under neoliberalism are grim.¶ D. Summary and Conclusion: The Symbolic Significance of Cuba¶ The saga of Cuban agriculture illustrates the ways in which developing countries are structurally disadvantaged in the global trading system by the colonial and post-colonial division of labor that relegates them to the production of primary agricultural commodities. Cuba's integration into the world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured goods and food products so deeply constrained its development options that not even a socialist revolution could alter these pre-existing trade and production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by external circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners, [\*486] decentralize agricultural production, prioritize domestic food production, and promote organic and semi-organic farming techniques.¶ Cuba is symbolically important because it demonstrates that there is an alternative to the dominant export-oriented industrial agricultural model and that this alternative can boost agricultural productivity, enhance food security, and protect the environment. n362 However, the transformation of Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was made possible by Cuba's relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the global trading system, Cuba, like every other developing country, will face intense pressure to restructure its economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is therefore important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether neoliberalism can ever be made compatible with food security and ecological sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for sustainable rural development.

#### SO MANY alt causes to dead zones – coastal and deep water ecosystems destroyed now

**Sielen, ’13** - Senior Fellow for International Environmental Policy at the Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (Alan B., “The Devolution of the Seas: The Consequences of Oceanic Destruction, *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140164/alan-b-sielen/the-devolution-of-the-seas)//CT

Yet another factor driving the decline of the oceans is the destruction of the habitats that have allowed spectacular marine life to thrive for millennia. Residential and commercial development have laid waste to once-wild coastal areas. In particular, humans are eliminating coastal marshes, which serve as feeding grounds and nurseries for fish and other wildlife, filter out pollutants, and fortify coasts against storms and erosion. Hidden from view but no less worrying is the wholesale destruction of deep-ocean habitats. For fishermen seeking ever more elusive prey, the depths of the seas have become the earth’s final frontier. There, submerged mountain chains called seamounts -- numbering in the tens of thousands and mostly uncharted -- have proved especially desirable targets. Some rise from the sea floor to heights approaching that of Mount Rainier, in Washington State. The steep slopes, ridges, and tops of seamounts in the South Pacific and elsewhere are home to a rich variety of marine life, including large pools of undiscovered species.

# 2nc

#### Virulent diseases cannot cause extinction because of burnout theory

**Gerber 5** (Leah R. Gerber, PhD. Associate Professor of Ecology, Evolution, and Environmental Sciences, Ecological Society of America, "Exposing Extinction Risk Analysis to Pathogens: Is Disease Just Another Form of Density Dependence?" August 2005, Jstor)

The density of it population is an important parameter for both PVA and host-pathogen theory. A fundamental principle of epidemiology is that the spread of an infectious disease through a population is a function of the density of both susceptible and infectious hosts. If infectious agents are supportable by the host species of conservation interest, the impact of a pathogen on a declining population is likely to decrease as the host population declines. A pathogen will spread when, on average, it is able to transmit to a susceptible host before an infected host dies or eliminates the infection (Kermack and McKendrick 1927, Anderson and May l99l). If the parasite affects the reproduction or mortality of its host, or the host is able to mount an immune response, the parasite population may eventually reduce the density of susceptible hosts to a level at which the rate of parasite increase is no longer positive. Most epidemiological models indicate that there is a host threshold density (or local population size) below which a parasite cannot invade, suggesting that rare or depleted species should be less subject to host-specific disease. This has implications for small, yet increasing, populations. For example, although endangered species at low density may be less susceptible to a disease outbreak, recovery to higher densities places them at increasing risk of future disease-related decline (e.g., southern sea otters; Gerber ct al. 2004). In the absence of stochastic factors (such as those modeled in PVA), and given the usual assumption of disease models that the chance that a susceptible host will become infected is proportional to the density of infected hosts (the mass action assumption) a host specific pathogen cannot drive its host to extinction (McCallum and Dobson 1995). Extinction in the absence of stochasticity is possible if alternate hosts (sometimes called reservoir hosts) relax the extent to which transmission depends on the density of the endangered host species.

#### They can’t win any offense – normalizing trade relations is a topical version of the aff

**French 9** – editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba (Anya, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf>)

the path to “normal” trade relations If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade actually occurs depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR). NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161 Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162 Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba. To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### Venezuelan oil investment would meet

De Cordoba and Munoz 13 (1/11/2013, JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA and SARA MUÑOZ, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html, JMP)

"It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector.

#### So would Mexican renewables

**Barber 11** – Editor @ Energy Trend

(DA, “Mexico’s Emerging Solar Market,” http://pv.energytrend.com/research/Mexico\_Emerging\_Solar\_Market.html)//BB

Today, solar power in Mexico amounts to less than 1 percent of Mexico's total energy production, meaning utility-scale solar power is not only in its infancy, it is a huge opportunity.

But entry into the Mexican solar industry market has specific hurdles. Mexican utilities are state-owned, making it difficult for independent power providers (IPPs) to enter the market, which includes power generation, transmission and distribution controlled by the government’s Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE). This means any development of the solar industry requires government backing. But the last few years has seen some progress: IPPs are now permitted to sell power to CFE for the industrial use, and corporations can produce electricity up to 30 MW for their own use. Though any surplus power can be sold to the state-owned national grid, the lucrative residential solar power market remains totally under state control.

#### B) American Culture

**Asghar ‘11** (Rob Asghar is a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy and a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy, Special to CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/opinion/asghar-globalization/index.html, November 17, 2011, LEQ) read the blue

The rapid growth of China and India does not mean the U.S. has fallen behind, Rob Asghar says Both face major environmental and infrastructural challenges within the next decade, he says Many East and South Asia societies are facing resistance to progress, Asghar says Asghar: U.S. may sabotage its tilt toward innovative growth if political dysfunction continues Editor's note: Rob Asghar is a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy and a member of the Pacific Council on International Policy. Los Angeles (CNN) -- China is poised to become the world's largest economy within a decade, according to some economists. Rising giant India already has a middle-class population that is larger than the entire United States population, according to others. Such nuggets fuel an industry of prophetic warnings of decline, exemplified by the phrase "How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented" in the subtitle of Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum's recent best-seller. The rapid growth of China and India and other Asian tigers does not mean that the United States has "fallen behind," however. It takes a panicked perspective to even ponder the point. China and India have immense economies, each with state-of-the-art technological centers that put others to shame. But they are also ranked 125th and 162nd, respectively, in GDP per capita (according to the CIA's World Factbook), lacking clean water and safe food for too many citizens. Rob Asghar Rob Asghar Both face massive environmental and infrastructural challenges within the next decade. Neither country is in range of providing an American level of services to its citizenry, much less the comfortable level typical of flourishing Northern European economies. And if we consider the deeper cultural dimensions of globalization and innovation, one could go so far as to argue that the globalization game is and will remain rigged in America's favor, with other nations not being able or even willing to catch up. In truth, many societies in East and South Asia are confronting ambivalence and resistance to developments that we might see as progress but that their traditionalists see as moral and social decline. Iran and Pakistan are just two examples of nations whose rapid modernization was undercut by underlying reactionary cultural forces. For related reasons, the various proud Asian tigers are not on an unbendable trajectory. Current trends are not destiny; it is more accurate to say that culture is destiny. Western academics may deride the "unoriginal" thinking of Chinese or Indian students, but this critique is based on an entirely different (some would say culturally imperialistic) worldview. Lao Tzu's "Tao Te Ching," still proudly full of wisdom today, stands as a reminder that disruption, individualism and innovation are inherently heretical in many traditional societies -- and if they occur in one area of a traditional society, a backlash typically follows in another. Gandhi's spirit, with its vigorous opposition to consumer capitalism, is hardly extinct. Meanwhile, America is the best at being America, because America is the closest thing to a society that unambivalently enjoys being American. The United States has cultural and demographic traits that remain unique -- for better and worse. American culture is peculiarly tilted toward valuing disruptive new ideas and welcoming the immigrant who brings such ideas into its society. An individualistic, heterogeneous, novelty-seeking American culture, strengthened by a critical mass of interdisciplinary American research universities that draw the world's best minds, represents a considerable edge in social and economic innovation. For today's emerging economies to become long-term giants, rather than variations of prerevolution Iran and the Soviet Union, they must become more economically and socially integrated. And to become economically integrated, they must become culturally integrated, which means a host of conflicts are on the horizon regarding varying societal views on change, tradition, materialism, social mobility, openness, patronage and so on. It will not be easy, and success is not inevitable. Many emerging nations are like a young child on the precipice of a tense and unpredictable adolescence. Eastern nations may in time become better than the West at the freewheeling socioeconomics that America and the rest of the West invented, but not without considerable social turmoil. A true taste for innovation and adaptation will result only from a vigorous clash between individualistic impulses and communitarian ones -- clashes that will take decades to play out, with uncertain outcomes. Americans may block their own path and sabotage their own cultural tilt toward innovative growth if political dysfunction continues. But with even some sensible reform of the political system, a resilient, forward-thinking and forward-moving economy should result. America was the key force in popping open the Pandoran box of commercial and cultural globalization, with all the attendant anxieties and unintended consequences. But the globalization game is an inherently American game, and it will take a great deal of luck, strategy and determination for someone else to play the game better than Americans are able to play it.the game better than Americans are able to play it.

#### C) No Challengers

**Kaplan ’11** - senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, and Kaplan, frmr. vice chairman – National Intelligence Council (Robert D and Stephen S, “America Primed,” The National Interest, March/April)

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders. Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course. Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order. In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence. China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance. The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption if its economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels. India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China. Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed. The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

#### D) Aging crisis proves.

**Haas, 07**- Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Mark, "A Geriatric Peace?", International Security, Volume 32, Number 1, Summer 2007, February 3rd 2010, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.112?cookieSet=1, KONTOPOULOS)

The crowding out of military and economic development spending for increased care for the elderly is not the only way in which social aging is likely to affect global power distributions. Social aging is likely to push militaries to spend more on personnel and less on other areas, including weapons development and procurement. This is important because no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military dominance without the ability to wage highly technologically sophisticated warfare.97 When states are forced to spend more of their military budgets on personnel than on research, development, and weapons procurement, the odds of continued U.S. military primacy increase substantially. The oldest of the great powers are already devoting signiªcantly more resources to military personnel than to weapons purchases and research. Over the last ten years, both France and Germany have dedicated nearly 60 percent of their military budgets to personnel, which is almost double the proportion in the U.S. budget. Germany spends nearly 4 times as much on personnel as on weapons procurement, France, Japan, and Russia roughly 2.5 times more. The United States, in contrast, dedicates only 1.29 times more money to personnel than to weapons purchases (see Table 9 for more statistics and sources).98 Social aging is a key cause of increasing military personnel costs for two main reasons. First, as societies age, more people exit the workforce than enter it. Increasing numbers of retirees in relation to new workers are likely to create labor shortages relative to previous levels of employment. The result of this trend will be increased competition among businesses and organizations— including the military—to hire workers. Consequently, if states’ militaries want to be able to attract and keep the best employees in vital areas of operation—especially those in high-technology ªelds who usually have the most employment options and can command high salaries in the private sector—they are going to have to pay more to do so. If militaries do not in-crease their outlays for personnel, their effectiveness will diminish. A 2006 report endorsed by EU defense ministers made precisely these points. The report states that “the aging of Europe’s people will lead to ªerce competition for young and skilled workers,” which will “inevitably” lead to rising military personnel per capita costs if European forces are to remain effective.99 Similarly, to keep military salaries on par with wages in its expanding economy, China (even though its armed forces are conscripted) has had to raise military wages sharply in recent years (an 84 percent increase for ofªcers and a 92 percent increase for soldiers from 1992 to 2002). In fact, according to the Chinese government, rising personnel expenses are the most important factor behind the growth of the Chinese defense budget in the last decade.100 A second factor that is increasing states’ military personnel costs at the expense of weapons procurement is the aging of the militaries themselves. The great powers’ pension obligations to retired military personnel are considerable. In Russia’s 2006 budget, more than 130.5 billion rubles, or more than 12 percent of total defense-related expenditures, were dedicated to military pensions. This figure represents roughly 35.5 billion rubles more than was spent on weapons purchases, and approximately 37.6 billion rubles more than on military research and development.101 Twenty-two percent of France’s defense budget goes to pensions.102 According to China’s government, rising pension costs are the second most important reason for increases in military spending in the last decade (after pay increases for active personnel).103 Even India, despite having the youngest population of all the great powers, currently spends almost 15 percent of its defense budget on pensions.104 Growing pension costs for military retirees are important for international power relationships because these expenditures, which are not one-time costs but ones that governments will have to pay every year for many decades, do nothing to increase states’ power-projection capabilities. Every dollar spent on retirees is one less dollar that can be spent on weapons, research, or active personnel. Consequently, every dollar spent in this area by the other great powers increases the likelihood of the continuation of U.S. primacy. Of all the major fiscal effects created by global aging, however, military pension expenditures may be the area of greatest relative weakness for the United States (other than health-care costs).105 The United States today spends more than $40 billion on military retirement.106 These costs alone would make it the seventh largest military spender in the world.107

#### Laundry list.

**Brooks and Wohlforth, 08** (Stephen G Brooks & William C. Wohlforth Associate Professors in the Department of Government @ Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance, p. 27-31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United States spends more on defense that all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

#### And – Anti-Americanism doesn’t affect policies – other countries understand the benefits of U.S. power

**Mandelbaum, 06** (Michael, professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins, Foreign Policy Jan/Feb, Lexis)

Inevitable Ingratitude Nor is the world likely to express much gratitude to the United States any time soon. Even if they privately value what the United States does for the world, other countries, especially democratic ones, will continue to express anti-American sentiments. That is neither surprising nor undesirable. Within democracies, spirited criticism of the government is normal, indeed vital for its effective performance. The practice is no different between and among democracies. Anti-Americanism has many domestic political uses. In many parts of the world, the United States serves as a convenient scapegoat for governments, a kind of political lightning rod to draw away from themselves the popular discontent that their shortcomings have helped to produce. That is particularly the case in the Middle East, but not only there. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder achieved an electoral victory in 2002 by denouncing the war in Iraq. Similarly, it is convenient, even comforting, to blame the United States for the inevitable dislocations caused by the great, impersonal forces of globalization. But neither the failure to acknowledge America's global role nor the barrage of criticism of it means that the officials of other countries are entirely unaware of the advantages that it brings them. If a global plebiscite concerning America's role in the world were held by secret ballot, most foreign-policy officials in other countries would vote in favor of continuing it. Though the Chinese object to the U.S. military role as Taiwan's protector, they value the effect that American military deployments in East Asia have in preventing Japan from pursuing more robust military policies. But others will not declare their support for America's global role. Acknowledging it would risk raising the question of why those who take advantage of the services America provides do not pay more for them. It would risk, that is, other countries' capacities to continue as free riders, which is an arrangement no government will

#### a) It sends a signal that strengthens rogue regimes

**Karon 10 –** senior editor at TIME, where he has covered international conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, and the Balkans since 1997 (Tony, Time, “Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba?” 4/21/2010, <http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,48773,00.html>) //RGP

Lifting the embargo will strengthen Castro's government There's no private sector in Cuba; its economy is predominantly state-owned, and trading with it inevitably strengthens the state. The government in Havana has been reeling since the collapse of its Soviet patron, but lifting the embargo would ease its financial crisis and therefore strengthen its hand. Cuba's trade with other Western countries hasn't eased repression Cuba has been trading normally with most of Latin America and Europe for more than a decade now, and Castro has shown no sign of reforming his system or ending repression. The idea that trade promotes human rights is a self-serving myth promoted by corporate America, and there's little reason to believe that an end to the embargo would automatically improve the political situation in Cuba. Easing the embargo before Castro agrees to change sends the wrong signal Castro continues to defy international standards on democracy and human rights, and lifting the embargo now would be to reward that defiance. His regime rejected even the reformist communism of Gorbachev in the '80s, but even though it has struggled to survive economically in the '90s, it has steadfastly maintained its hard line. Democracy should be the condition for lifting the embargo.

#### There is no plausible scenario for resource wars

**Victor, 07** – Senior Fellow @ Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Woods Institute for the Environment (David, “What Resource Wars?”, 11/1/2007, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-7344601/What-resource-wars-From-Arabia.html)

THE SECOND surge in thinking about resource wars comes from all the money that is pulsing into resource-rich countries. There is no question that the revenues are huge. OPEC cashed $650 billion for 11.7 billion barrels of the oil it sold in 2006, compared with $110 billion in 1998, when it sold a similar quantity of oil at much lower prices. Russia's Central Bank reports that the country earned more than $300 billion selling oil and gas in 2006, about four times its annual haul in the late 1990s. But will this flood in rents cause conflict and war? There is no question that large revenues--regardless of the source--can fund a lot of mischievous behavior. Iran is building a nuclear-weapons program with the revenues from its oil exports. Russia has funded trouble in Chechnya, Georgia and other places with oil and gas rents. Hugo Chavez opened Venezuela's bulging checkbook to help populists in Bolivia and to poke America in ways that could rekindle smoldering conflicts. Islamic terrorists also have benefited, in part, from oil revenues that leak out of oil-rich societies or are channeled directly from sympathetic governments. But resource-related conflicts are multi-causal. In no case would simply cutting the resources avoid or halt conflict, even if the presence of natural resources can shift the odds. Certainly, oil revenues have advanced Iran's nuclear program, which is a potential source of hot conflict and could make future conflicts a lot more dangerous. But a steep decline in oil probably wouldn't strangle the program on its own. Indeed, while Iran still struggles to make a bomb, resource-poor North Korea has already arrived at that goal by starving itself and getting help from friends. Venezuela's checkbook allows Chavez to be a bigger thorn in the sides of those he dislikes, but there are other thorns that poke without oil money. As we see, what matters is not just money but how it is used. While Al-Qaeda conjures images of an oil-funded network--because it hails from the resource-rich Middle East and its seed capital has oily origins--other lethal terror networks, such as Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers and Ireland's Republican Army, arose with funding from diasporas rather than oil or other natural resources. Unlike modern state armies that require huge infusions of capital, terror networks are usually organized to make the most of scant funds. During the run-up in oil and gas prices, analysts have often claimed that these revenues will go to fund terror networks; yet it is sobering to remember that Al-Qaeda came out in the late 1990s, when oil earnings were at their lowest in recent history. Most of the tiny sums of money needed for the September 11 attacks came from that period. Al-Qaeda's daring attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania occurred when oil-rich patrons were fretting about the inability to make ends meet at home because revenues were so low. Ideology and organization trump money as driving forces for terrorism. Most thinking about resource-lubed conflict has concentrated on the ways that windfalls from resources cause violence by empowering belligerent states or sub-state actors. But the chains of cause and effect are more varied. For states with weak governance and resources that are easy to grab, resources tend to make weak states even weaker and raise the odds of hot conflict. This was true for Angola's diamonds and Nigeria's oil, which in both cases have helped finance civil war. For states with stable authoritarian governments--such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, most of the rest in the western Gulf, and perhaps also Russia and Venezuela--the problem may be the opposite. A sharp decline in resource revenues can create dangerous vacuums where expectations are high and paltry distributions discredit the established authorities. On balance, the windfall in oil revenues over recent years is probably breeding more conflict than would a crash in prices. However, while a few conflicts partly trace themselves to resources, it is the other pernicious effects of resource windfalls, such as the undermining of democratic transitions and the failure of most resource-reliant societies to organize their economies around investment and productivity, that matter much, much more. At best, resources have indirect and mixed effects on conflict. Climate Dangers THE THIRD avenue for concern about coming resource wars is through the dangers of global climate change. The litany is now familiar. Sea levels will rise, perhaps a lot; storms will probably become more intense; dry areas are prone to parch further and wet zones are likely to soak longer. And on top of those probable effects, unchecked climate change raises the odds of suffering nasty surprises if the world's climate and ecosystems respond in abrupt ways. Adding all that together, the scenarios are truly disturbing. Meaningful action to stem the dangers is long overdue.In the United States over the last year, the traditional security community has become engaged on these issues. Politically, that conversion has been touted as good news because the odds of meaningful policy are higher if hawks also favor action. Their concerns are seen through the lens of resource wars, with fears such as: water shortages that amplify grievances and trigger conflict; migrations of "climate refugees", which could stress border controls and also cause strife if the displaced don't fit well in their new societies; and diseases such as malaria that could be harder to contain if tropical conditions are more prevalent, which in turn could stress health-care systems and lead to hot wars.While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don't happen--usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny--the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker "climate" conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces. The dangers of disease have caused particular alarm in the advanced industrialized world, partly because microbial threats are good fodder for the imagination. But none of these scenarios hold up because the scope of all climate-sensitive diseases is mainly determined by the prevalence of institutions to prevent and contain them rather than the raw climatic factors that determine where a disease might theoretically exist. For example, the threat industry has flagged the idea that a growing fraction of the United States will be malarial with the higher temperatures and increased moisture that are likely to come with global climate change. Yet much of the American South is already climatically inviting for malaria, and malaria was a serious problem as far north as Chicago until treatment and eradication programs started in the 19th century licked the disease. Today, malaria is rare in the industrialized world, regardless of climate, and whether it spreads again will hinge on whether governments stay vigilant, not so much on patterns in climate. If Western countries really cared about the spread of tropical diseases and the stresses they put on already fragile societies in the developing world, they would redouble their efforts to tame the diseases directly (as some are now doing) rather than imagining that efforts to lessen global warming will do the job. Eradication usually depends mainly on strong and responsive governments, not the bugs and their physical climate. Rethinking Policy IF RESOURCE wars are actually rare--and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors--then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed.First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China, this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources--not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC'S attempt to buy Unocal--along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets--sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis--yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. The sweep of history points against classic resource wars. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets. At the same time, much higher expectations must be placed on China to tame the pernicious effects of its recent efforts to secure special access to natural resources. Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe are three particularly acute examples where Chinese (and in Sudan's case, Indian) government investments, sheltered under a foreign-policy umbrella, have caused harm by rewarding abusive governments. That list will grow the more insecure China feels about its ability to source vital energy and mineral supplies. Some of what is needed is patience because these troubles will abate as China itself realizes that going out is an expensive strategy that buys little in security. Chinese state oil companies are generally well-run organizations; as they are forced to pay the real costs of capital and to compete in the marketplace, they won't engage in these strategies. The best analog is Brazil's experience, where its state-controlled oil company has become ever smarter--and more market oriented--as the Brazilian government has forced it to operate at arm's length without special favors. That has not only allowed Petrobras to perform better, but it has also made Brazil's energy markets function better and with higher security.Beyond patience, the West can help by focusing the spotlight on dangerous practices--clearly branding them the problem. There's some evidence that the shaming already underway is having an effect--evident, for example, in China's recent decision to no longer use its veto in the UN Security Council to shield Sudan's government. At the same time, the West can work with its own companies to make payments to governments (and officials) much more transparent and to close havens for money siphoned from governments. Despite many initiatives in this area, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the now-stalled attempt by some oil companies to "Publish What You Pay", little has been accomplished. Actual support for such policies by the most influential governments is strikingly rare. America is notably quiet on this front. With regard to the flow of resources to terrorists--who in turn cause conflicts and are often seen as a circuitous route to resource wars--policymakers must realize that this channel for oil money is good for speeches but perhaps the least important reason to stem the outflow of money for buying imported hydrocarbons. Much more consequential is that the U.S. call on world oil resources is not sustainable because a host of factors--such as nationalization of oil resources and insecurity in many oil-producing regions--make it hard for supply to keep pace with demand. This yields tight and jittery markets and still-higher prices. These problems will just get worse unless the United States and other big consumers temper their demand. The goal should not be "independence" from international markets but a sustainable path of consumption. When the left-leaning wings in American politics and the industry-centered National Petroleum Council both issue this same warning about energy supplies--as they have over the last year--then there is an urgent need for the United States to change course. Yet Congress and the administration have done little to alter the fundamental policy incentives for efficiency. At this writing, the House and Senate are attempting to reconcile two versions of energy bills, neither of which, strikingly, will cause much fundamental change to the situation.Cutting the flow of revenues to resource-rich governments and societies can be a good policy goal, but success will require American policymakers to pursue strategies that they will find politically toxic at home. One is to get serious about taxation. The only durable way to rigorously cut the flow of resources is to keep prices high (and thus encourage efficiency as well as changes in behavior that reduce dependence on oil) while channeling the revenues into the U.S. government treasury rather than overseas. In short, that means a tax on imported oil and a complementary tax on all fuels sold in the United States so that a fuel import tax doesn't simply hand a windfall to domestic producers. And if the United States (and other resource consumers) made a serious effort to contain financial windfalls to natural-resources exporters, it would need--at the same time--to confront a more politically poisonous task: propping up regimes or easing the transition to new systems of governance in places where vacuums are worse than incumbents.Given all the practical troubles for the midwives of regime change, serious policy in this area would need to deal with many voids.Finally, serious thinking about climate change must recognize that the "hard" security threats that are supposedly lurking are mostly a ruse. They are good for the threat industry--which needs danger for survival--and they are good for the greens who find it easier to build a coalition for policy when hawks are supportive.

#### No resource wars – states don’t care

**NOW Lebanon 10** (February 10. NOW Lebanon, “Improbable War or Impossible Peace?”, <http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=145813> Pismarov)

“Water wars”, “the Blue Gold rush”, “the century of water wars”: These threatening formulas have emerged over the past few years. Future conflicts of varying intensity are predicted, and the control of hydra resources is at stake. The 20th century was supposedly that of the black gold wars. Ecological concerns have thus driven futurologists to dub the 21st century “the century of blue gold wars.” So many wars are in sight! One can live without petroleum, but not without water. Yet when looking at things from a historical perspective, one must consider these tragic predictions in context. The enumeration of the acts of violence that are directly linked to the control of aquifers since ancient times leads after much pain to a shorter list of less intense eruptions of violence, including riots and skirmishes between various villages . These are almost systematically localized, isolated, popular acts of violence. Governments are seemingly unwilling to allow themselves to be dragged into conflicts triggered by local problems. The paradox is as follows: The only resource that is indispensable for life generates minor tensions, whereas non-necessary, and even superfluous, resources have given rise to conflicts and inequalities, leading economists to speak of a “natural resources curse.”  This paradox prevails among Middle Eastern leaders. “With water you can make politics. With land you can make war,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a seminar on the sustainable management of water in 1995 . Israeli and Palestinian officials make only a marginal reference to the water issue in their public speeches. This is a long way behind the issue of security for the Israelis, and the issues of refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem for the Palestinians. One should certainly keep in mind that such a statement by the Israeli prime minister was politically motivated, but this position is symptomatic of the symbolic value of “land” and the instrumental value of “water”. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that while water is, in all likelihood, not an issue in a future war, it is still a herald of peace. In fact, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula are the most arid regions of the globe. In the Middle East, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel are the only countries that are relatively spared from water shortages. Syria is in a situation of hydric stress. In other words, according to the United Nations, available resources are estimated between 1,000 and 1,700 m3 per individual per year. Other countries in the region suffer from hydric shortage (less than 1,000 m3 per individual per year). The average level of water resources in the region hovers around 1,400 m3 per individual per year. This level will witness a 50% decrease by 2025 due to population growth. Agriculture squanders up to 90% of freshwater supplies compared to a world average of 70% , while industry and domestic use make up the remaining 10%. One of the most contentious issues in the region is Israel’s water consumption, which is several times higher than that of its neighbors due to treaties that grant it privileged access to the region’s hydric resources. Yet these tensions do not underlie the disputes between those countries. The unequal division of water resources is actually just one dimension of these disputes, and not necessarily a dimension that drives crises to escalate.

#### Economic incentives prevent resource war escalation

**Meierding, 07** – Ph.D. Student at the University of Chicago (Emily, “Strategic Substitution and the Declining Likelihood of International Resource Wars”, March 2007 prepared for the International Studies Association Conference)

The prevailing pessimistic view has met with some dissent, arising from a variety of quarters. In a study of international territorial dispute resolution, Beth Simmons makes the theoretical observation that states possess powerful economic incentives to resolve territorial conflicts. Stable agreements facilitate trade and international investment. 23 Firm international demarcation also functions as a credible signal of participant states’ commitment to the rule of law and their respect for private property rights. These demonstration effects help attract international investment. 24 The presence of natural resources should increase states’ imperative to resolve border disputes. When international borders are contested, resource ownership is ambiguous. This impedes extractive industry development and resource sales. Consequently, states possess a powerful incentive to clarify resource control.

#### Other countries are beginning to adopt the Cuban model now

**Friedman-Rudovsky, 12** – received a Fulbright fellowship for photography of Bolivia’s social movements and a contributor to The New York Times (Noah, “Urban Agriculture in Cuba (Photo Essay)”, NACLA (North American Congress on Latin America), 10/18/12, https://nacla.org/news/2012/10/18/urban-agriculture-cuba-photo-essay)//VP

Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel. Many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. In 2007, Fidel Castro warned in the first published essay after his illness: "More than three billion people in the world are being condemned to a premature death from hunger and thirst" by diverting food crops to biofuels. In the past four years, food prices have indeed skyrocketed and a 2011 report by Oxfam identifies biofuel production as a principal cause of food insecurity. Some Cubans see their urban agriculture movement as a possible solution as the world begins to grapple with increasing prices and demand for food and fuel: "There is an ecological trend, a green philosophy. This is an urgent call, an immediate future; the large urban centers, with the problems of oil production and the transport of goods, this could be a worldwide solution as it has been in Cuba. We have the advantage of having gone through what other countries may experience in 50 years,” says Miguel Salcines Lopez, President of Havana’s largest urban agriculture cooperative, Vivero Alamar. Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Cuba entered a period of extreme shortages that came to be known as "The Special Period." With imports such as food, fuel, pesticides, and fertilizers disappearing almost overnight, Cubans began to grow their own produce wherever they could—balconies, empty lots, and roof-tops. Initially these were grassroots initiatives born of necessity, but over the next decade they would become a central tenet of state planning and a pillar for the island's economy. A homage to the history of Cuban urban agriculture in the home of Oscar Aleman Perez in Havana. In the 1970s and '80s, Raul Castro, as Defense Minister, encouraged the development of urban agriculture and oversaw experimental organic farming in military facilities. In those days, the organoponicos, as they came to be known, were introduced in preparation for a possible worldwide embargo of Cuba; today they are a training ground and growth area for Raul Castro's economic reforms that allow for more small business. In 1994, the Ministry of Agriculture institutionalized urban agriculture initiatives under one umbrella. Projects from informal family gardens (huertos), to large cooperatives (organoponicos), to state-owned gardens would all receive assistance from the ministry, which sought to provide free land to residents for gardens, through support in the start-up phase, providing seed banks, and overseeing hundreds of horticultural clubs for information exchange. Many Cubans assumed that as the shortages of the 1990s faded, so too would urban agriculture, but instead it has expanded in the last decade. Indeed, many other countries have begun to use the Cuban experience as a model as locally grown, organic produce becomes more popular worldwide. Of the recently released linamientos, or guidelines, for economic and social reforms in Cuba, 12 refer to urban agriculture. Number 174 states the necessity of increasing agricultural initiatives that can substitute for food imports, “with emphasis in the execution of the urban agriculture program, which should be extended to the entire country.”

#### Cuban ag is being modeled now – Cuban farmers are travelling to other countries to spread it

**Clausen, 07 –** teaches sociology and environmental studies at Fort Lewis College in Durango, CO. Her research in environmental sociology focuses on fisheries and marine degradation**.** (Rebecca, “Healing the Rift” Monthly Review, May, http://monthlyreview.org/2007/05/01/healing-the-rift)//VP

The rift in social metabolism of food production under capitalism is aggravated by private ownership of land, the strict division between mental and manual labor, and the unjust distribution of the fruits of labor. Cuba’s model of agriculture systematically transcends these alienating conditions, reconnecting farmers to the land through cooperative production, participatory decision making, and diversified distribution. Can this vision for ecological sustainability and social equality extend beyond the island of Cuba? Cuban farmers are traveling to Latin American and Caribbean nations to assist farmers in setting up similar types of food production systems. Indeed, Cuba’s fastest growing export is currently ideas. Cuba hosts many visiting farmers and agricultural technicians from throughout the Americas and elsewhere. Cuban agronomists are currently teaching agroecological farming methods to Haitian farmers, as well as assisting Venezuela with their burgeoning urban agriculture movement.

#### Cuba’s agricultural system is a model for the globe

**Barclay 3-** writer and reporter

(Eliza Barclay, “Cuba's security in fresh produce,” Food First, September 12th, 2003, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1208)//HA

The news of Cuba's success has been slowly leaking out since the early 1990s, and the country is beginning to take on legendary status as a model for sustainable agriculture and local food production in the eyes of environmental advocates, farmers, and development specialists. Already lauded for years by the steady stream of sustainable farming gurus from around the world who have made the pilgrimage to observe the success of organic and local food production, Cuba's experiment with sustainable agriculture has succeeded beyond its trial period. American farmers have been shuttled to Cuba in "fact-finding missions" and "reality tours" by crafty NGOs who have obtained the highly coveted U.S. Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) licenses allowing them to sponsor travel to Cuba for educational purposes. Whether many of these trips will be allowed to continue is unclear; in March 2003, OFAC announced the end of people-to-people exchanges. Most groups who have had the appropriate licenses are scheduled to lose them by December 2003. But a rapidly approaching future of shifting economic opportunities poses serious questions and potential risks to this Cuba’s model, regarded as precious by so many of its advocates.

#### Greater US imports will out-compete Cuban organics and collapse the system – NAFTA empirics prove

**McKibben, 05 –** author, environmentalist, and activist. In 1988, he wrote The End of Nature, the first book for a common audience about global warming. He is the co-founder and Chairman of the Board at 350.org, an international climate campaign that works in 188 countries around the world (Bill, “The Cuba Diet”, Harper’s Magazine, April, reprinted here - http://billtotten.blogspot.com/2005/04/cuba-diet.html)//VP

One question is: How resilient is the new Cuban agriculture? Despite ever tougher restrictions on US travel and remittances from relatives, the country has managed to patch together a pretty robust tourist industry in recent years: Havana's private restaurants fill nightly with Canadians and Germans. The government's investment in the pharmaceutical industry appears to be paying off, too, and now people who are fed by ox teams are producing genetically engineered medicines at some of the world's more advanced labs. Foreign exchange is beginning to flow once more; already many of the bicycles in the streets have been replaced by buses and motorbikes and Renaults. Cuba is still the most unconsumer place I've ever been - there's even less to buy than in the old Soviet Union - but sooner or later Castro will die. What then? Most of the farmers and agronomists I interviewed professed conviction that the agricultural changes ran so deep they would never be eroded. Perez, however, did allow that there were a lot of younger oxen drivers who yearned to return to the cockpits of big tractors, and according to news reports some of the country's genetic engineers are trying to clone White Udder herself from leftover tissue. If Cuba simply opens to the world economy - if Castro gets his professed wish and the US embargo simply disappears, replaced by a free-trade regime - it's very hard to see how the sustainable farming would survive for long. We use pesticides and fertilizers because they make for incredibly cheap food. None of that dipping the seedling roots in some bacillus solution, or creeping along the tomato rows looking for aphids, or taking the oxen off to be shoed. Our industrial agriculture - at least as heavily subsidized by Washington as Cuba's farming once was subsidized by Moscow - simply overwhelms its neighbors. For instance, consider Mexico and corn. Not long ago the journalist Michael Pollan told the story of what happened when NAFTA opened that country's markets to a flood of cheap, heavily subsidized US maize: the price fell by half, and 1.3 million small farmers were put out of business, forced to sell their land to larger, more corporate farms that could hope to compete by mechanizing (and lobbying for subsidies of their own). A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace enumerated the environmental costs: fertilizer runoff suffocating the Sea of Cortez, water shortages getting worse as large-scale irrigation booms. Genetically modified corn varieties from the United States are contaminating the original strains of the crop, which began in southern Mexico.

#### Lifting the embargo will collapse Cuban agriculture – US agribusiness will buy it out

**Crawford, 03** - Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law (Colin, “Necessity Makes the Frog Jump: Land-Use Planning and Urban Agriculture in Cuba” 16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 733, lexis)//VP

On September 26, 2002, the largest-ever U.S. trade show in Cuba was held in a Havana suburb. Its purpose was to showcase U.S. food and agriculture. The sponsors included a dazzling list of U.S. agri-industrial superstars - from the makers of highly processed foods like Spam, M & M chocolate candies, and Sara Lee cakes, to the products of [\*780] agribusiness giants like Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, ConAgra, and Tyson Foods. The next day, The New York Times plastered a picture on its front page of Cuban President Fidel Castro at the show, gingerly fingering a plate containing a hamburger and french fries, a chocolate milk shake nearby.n223 One could hardly imagine a more vivid illustration of the challenges Cuban agriculture will face when the U.S. embargo is lifted. Specifically, United States and other foreign agribusiness giants, eager to enter the Cuban market, anxiously await the time they can press everything from processed foods to genetically modified seeds and chemical fertilizers on the Cuban market. Despite Cuban claims that they will resist this onslaught just as they have resisted the attempts to meddle with their internal politics since the Revolution, the expansion of agricultural markets could well prove an unstoppable juggernaught.n224 In a country where food purchases can require as much as two-thirds of an average Cuban's salary, the lure of comparatively cheap agricultural inputs and even cheaper food could easily lead to social unrest if not permitted by the government. n225 In short, the pressure to accept cheaper U.S. and other foreign agricultural products, could well prove to be the necessity that next prods the Cuban frog to jump.

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#### We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

**PressTV 11/13**

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

#### a) 30 Senators up for grabs

**Sargent 12/20**

Greg, Washington Post, Divide deepens among Democrats on Iran, 12/20/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/12/20/divide-deepens-among-democrats-on-iran/

At his presser today, President Obama reiterated his opposition to Congress passing any bill now imposing new sanctions on Iran. He repeated that his goal is to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, and said he would prefer to accomplish this through diplomacy, adding: “I would think that would be the preference on Capitol Hill.”¶ Translation: By imperiling the prospect of a long term diplomatic solution curbing Iran’s nuclear program, Congress would be making war more likely.¶ I’m told that Senator Barbara Boxer, a leading opponent of a new sanctions bill and a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee, is working behind the scenes to persuade other Senate Democrats to oppose against any such bill if it comes up for a vote.¶ “I’m definitely talking to my colleagues and making the case that a rush to a new sanctions bill could disrupt these sensitive negotiations with Iran,” Boxer says, in a statement emailed my way.¶ That raises an interesting question: What if this bill comes to a vote and goes down in the Senate?¶ Already, Democrats are divided on the push for a new sanctions bill. Senators Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer are leading the push for the bill, and they have been joined by 11 other Democratic Senators. On the other hand, 10 Dem Senators — all committee chairs — have come out against the sanctions bill, arguing in a letter to Harry Reid that “new sanctions would play into the hands of those in Iran who are most eager to see the negotiations fail.”¶ That leaves at least 30 Dem Senators who may be up for grabs.¶ This means that, in addition to the organizing that Boxer is undertaking, you’re all but certain to see more pressure be brought to bear on Democrats to back off of Congressional action right now. (There is also pressure on them to support the new sanctions bill, but the organizing that’s taking place against it is getting less attention.) As HuffPo reported yesterday, liberal groups like MoveOn and CREDO are already pillorying senators Menendez and Schumer for undermining the negotiations and playing into GOP efforts to fracture Dem unity on Iran. Pressure will probably be brought to bear on undecided Dems, too.¶ Senate aides say they are not ready to predict whether the Iran sanctions bill will or won’t pass. Right now 13 Republicans have signed on to the Menendez-Schumer bill. But you could conceivably see Republican Senators like Rand Paul and Mike Lee, who have been more suspicious of the use of American power abroad than neocons or GOP internationalists have traditionally been, come out against the bill. I’ve asked Senator Paul’s office where he stands and haven’t received an answer. What will he say?¶ There will also be tremendous pressure brought to bear from both sides on Harry Reid, who has yet to say whether he’ll allow it to come to a vote. If more Dems come out against the bill, it will become harder for him to bring it to a vote.¶ It remains very possible that the bill will pass the Senate, and if the White House is right, that could imperil the chances of a long term diplomatic breakthrough. But it’s also possible the bill will fail, which would be a major rebuke to the hawks.

#### b) It’s about bargaining and focus – the plan undermines Obama’s consistent message and prevents him from asking for favors

**Moore 9/10**

Heidi, Guardian's US finance and economics editor, “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, 9/10/13, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### c) Obama’s political capital is key – assumes all thumpers

**Balakrishnan 12/1**

Bhaskar, The Hindu Business Line, Time to end Iran's isolation, 12/1/13, Lexis

When the US Congress meets on December 9, it will no doubt take stock of the situation. Congress is the determining factor in easing general economic sanctions, something Iran desperately seeks, while the US President has powers to provide only limited relief. A Bill on more sanctions has been passed in the House by a huge bipartisan majority (400-22), and a similar Bill in the Senate is under active consideration. Considerable political capital and persuasion will be needed to get the Senate to hold off on more sanctions.¶ The gains¶ Iran has much to gain from a comprehensive agreement with the P5 plus Germany. (P5 refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Along with Germany — P5+1 — they are making diplomatic efforts over Iran's nuclear programme.) Lifting the sanctions would provide the benefits of economic growth for its population. The regime would find it easier to manage demands for greater freedom. A civil nuclear programme could grow rapidly. Conventional arms purchases and technology transfers would greatly strengthen the country. Its dominant position in the Gulf and as the leader of Shia Muslims would be recognised. The US and western allies would benefit from Iran's retreat from the nuclear weapons threshold. The nuclear non-proliferation movement would be strengthened and countries that emulate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons capability, discouraged. ¶ The success of diplomacy would stabilise the oil markets and boost world markets. Iran would be a counter to the Taliban-Al Qaeda influence in Afghanistan. ¶ Further, President Rouhani's success could well boost moderate candidates in the 2016 parliamentary elections in Iran.¶ However, Israel and Saudi Arabia oppose the interim agreement. ¶ The way forward¶ The US Congress is a major problem for the Obama administration in getting the sanctions lifted. There is deep suspicion over Iran's intentions, rightwing hostility, and bitter division over domestic issues such as healthcare and government spending. The approaching 2014 congressional election has also cast its shadow. Obama needs to be encouraged to go further by the international community. It is hoped that Iran's leaders will also realise the importance of gaining support from the US Congress.

#### a) Cuba lobby blocks the plan

**Quinones 13**

Brendan, Ending the Trade Embargo against Cuba—a Long Overdue Foreign Policy Pivot, 4/18/13, http://savejersey.com/2013/04/a-new-tac-for-cuba/

Standing as the greatest roadblock to removing the trade embargo against Cuba, the highly mobilized and politically powerful Cuban-American lobby has unceasingly pushed for hardline policies towards Cuba. Residing largely in the electoral vote rich state of Florida, Cuban-Americans have enjoyed a tremendous amount of political capital—capital they spend on keeping the embargo in place. Traditionally, the toss-up nature of Florida in presidential elections has made politicians from both side of the aisle weary of upsetting Cuban-Americans, hoping instead to garner their support come Election Day.

#### b) Engaging Cuba trades off with other issues

\*\*citing Arash Aramesh, a national security analyst at Stanford Law School

**Williams 13**

Carol, Los Angeles Times, Political calculus keeps Cuba on U.S. list of terror sponsors, 5/3/13, http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list-20130502,0,2494970.story

Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example. Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its ally in the region with the official censure.¶ The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother, Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before they could leave their country for foreign travel.¶ There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry, though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly failed for nearly 50 years.”¶ The political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at bay.¶ It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime.¶ “It’s a question of how much political cost you want to incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”

#### c) Powerful house members backlash

**Lee 13 -** Senior Production Editor of Council on Foreign Relations (Brianna, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations Background Publication, 1/31/13, [http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113) //RGP](http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)%20//RGP)

Ending the economic embargo against Cuba would require congressional approval. Opinions in Congress are mixed: A group of influential Republican lawmakers from Florida, including former representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, his brother Mario Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen are stridently anti-Castro. Still, many favor improving relations with Cuba. In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, released a report calling for U.S. policy changes. He said: "We must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances U.S. interests" (PDF). Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counter-narcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term. Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba**.** The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

#### d) Costs massive capital

**Quinn 12**

John, The Risky Shift, A Case For Ending The US Embargo Against Cuba, 3/1/12, http://theriskyshift.com/2012/03/case-for-ending-us-embargo-against-cuba-html/

These reforms have been met with criticism, specifically from Members of Congress who represent districts where there are large Cuban-Diaspora populations who have strong feelings of hostility towards the Castro regime. One such district is represented by Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who also chairs the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, where a bill repealing the embargo would have to go through. These parties oppose removing the embargo and feel that these reforms will do nothing to help the people of Cuba and will aid the regime.¶ Looking at the political situation surrounding this issue within the context of broader US debates regarding economic and foreign policy (at the moment focused narrowly on Iran) it seems unlikely that any further reforms or a repeal are possible in the near future simply because the White House will not use its limited political capital on the Hill to push it through. This is s shame because the current reforms will most certainly do nothing.

#### No lobby push – no constituency in Congress – only a risk of PC decline

**Hakim et al 12**

Peter Hakim, Andrés Rozental, Rubens Barbosa, Riordan Roett, Ruben Olmos, “What Will Obama's Second Term Mean for Latin America?” [http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3135] November 8 //mtc

Q: Barack Obama was re-elected president of the United States on Tuesday. What is his vision for foreign policy and how does Latin America fit into his plans? How will Latin American leaders and their citizens react to the election results? What role did Latinos in the United States play in the election and what does that mean for U.S. policy changes on issues such as immigration, drugs and Cuba? ¶ A: Peter Hakim, member of the Advisor board and president emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue: "Any speculation about Obama's second term has to come mainly from his first-term performance. The campaign was about the candidates and their biographies—not about issues. Nothing suggests Congress will be more productive. The House remains virtually unchanged. The Senate will be more divisive still as most remaining moderate Republicans and Democrats resigned or lost their seats. We will know soon whether compromise is possible when the lame-duck Congress returns next week, and begins discussion of the fiscal cliff embroglio. The best guess is that Congress will find a way, not to resolve the problem, but to defer its consequences. The election results focused attention on immigration policy, which both Republicans and Democrats may be motivated to address. President Obama's declared intention to address immigration was surely reinforced by the huge Latino vote. Many of the Republicans who blocked previous immigration initiatives will resist again. But some recognize their party may become irrelevant unless they take seriously the Latino and black constituencies that accounted for more than 40 percent of Obama's total. U.S. immigration reform would be a welcome change in most of Latin America, particularly in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. Obama may seek to pursue further openings to Cuba—but these will be limited unless the Cuban government shows a willingness to reciprocate with new human rights measures or political changes. Drug policy is not high on the U.S. agenda, but the approval in Colorado and Washington of ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana use may spark wider discussion on drug issues. But Mitt Romney offered the most significant policy proposal for Latin America, when called for more intensive U.S. efforts to pursue multiplying economic opportunities in the region." ¶ A: Andrés Rozental, member of the Advisor board, president of Rozental & Asociados in Mexico City and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution: "President Obama's re-election is a welcome development for Latin Americans in general, and Mexicans in particular. Although many of Obama's campaign promises in 2008 relevant to the region remain unrealized, there is a modicum of hope that as a leader in his second term, with more political capital to spend, he can at least make a stronger effort to tackle comprehensive immigration reform and trade issues critical to Latin American prosperity. Although I don't foresee any major change in the United States' foreign policy toward the region, especially as long as Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East remain priorities for Washington, that may not necessarily be a bad thing. We often complain when Washington pays too much attention to us, and equally when there's less overt interest in the region, but I believe that Obama has mostly shown a much more mature attitude toward Latin America over the last four years than has traditionally been the case. This will hopefully also be the case as his administration continues through 2016. Presumably, there will continue to be a strong focus on completing ongoing trade negotiations, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to open new opportunities for economic growth and hopefully a re-visiting of NAFTA as a key option to make North America more competitive on the global scene. Latinos played a key role in re-electing Obama, just as they did in 2008, and the one message that Republicans have to take home at this stage is that the anti-immigrant, exclusionary policies voiced during the campaign by Mitt Romney, the Tea Party and other conservatives were a key factor in their ultimate defeat. Many of Obama's liberal views on minority rights and tolerance turned out to be much more popular among Americans as a whole than the opposing Republican positions on those same issues."¶ A: Rubens Barbosa, former ambassador of Brazil to the United States: "In his second term, Obama will be more interested in looking for his legacy in history. The U.S. government will tend to be more proactive and try to increase its influence in the current hot spots: Pakistan, Syria, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. The relationship with China will continue to be high on the foreign policy agenda. Having in mind this scenario, Latin America will continue to be off the radar of U.S. decision makers: the region will remain a low priority for Washington. Despite this fact, the reaction of the Latin American leaders and citizens to Obama's re-election has been very positive. The role of Latinos in the election was important and in some places crucial. In terms of policy changes on issues such as immigration, drugs and Cuba, Obama will continue to face strong opposition from the Republican Party but I would not be surprised if new ideas could be advanced by the administration especially in relation to immigration and Cuba."¶ A: Riordan Roett, director of the Latin American Studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies: "While the president's re-election is welcome in general terms, it is difficult to imagine Latin America will receive greater attention in the next four years. Congress remains deeply divided. The administration's foreign policy priorities will continue to focus on China, the Middle East and the ongoing fiscal challenges. Given the strong turnout by the Latino community, one area that should receive priority is continued immigration reform, but it is the third rail for the Republican majority in the House. In general, the democratic governments of the region will welcome the president's election without great expectation for major policy initiatives. The populist regimes will continue to denounce any democratically elected administration. The deadlock over Cuba will continue unless there is a dramatic leadership shift to a new generation. The major policy initiative that would be welcome in the region is on drug policy, but that issue will remain taboo."

#### Err neg – legislation can only deplete capital

**Fisher** (staffwriter) 1/6/**03**[Kenneth L., “Three’s a Charm,” Forbes, LN]

Having bucked the trend and added midterm power, will President Bush now legislate heavily, voiding the third-year magic? Unlikely. He can build political capital or spend it. Legislating means spending it, hurting his 2004 goals. I'd bet he keeps building capital. Remember, he needs marginal 2004 voters. If he pushes legislation, those he takes from will hate it more than those he gives to will love it. The losers will be energized for 2004 revenge; the winners, placated, will lose their urge to vote or help Bush's campaign.